PA Judge: Registry Internet ID Provision Vague

NOTE: This article and its contents apply only to the case mentioned, not to anyone with same or similar situations. Please do not apply the court’s ruling to your individual case without an attorney or court instructions in writing.

[Armstrong County, PA] On Dec. 3, 2025, Judge James J. Panchik of the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County, ruled SORNA’s internet identifier provision is unconstitutionally vague. The Com. v. Michael Diebold case arises from a new failure‑to‑provide‑accurate‑registration‑information charge filed after the defendant, in litigating a habeas petition in an earlier SORNA case, disclosed a list of 66 websites he used and a Craigslist email exchange about brush‑cutting services. In response, PSP and the Armstrong County DA treated both Craigslist itself and a Craigslist‑generated relay email address as “internet identifiers” that had to be registered within three business days under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(3) and 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.15 and 9799.16.​

The defendant moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of prima facie case, due process, vagueness, de minimis, and malicious prosecution, but the court resolved the case solely on the statutory‑vagueness issue as to “internet identifiers.”​

Core statutory interpretation and vagueness holding

The court focused on three clusters of statutory language: “any other designations used in Internet communications or postings” in § 9799.15(g)(8); “any designations or monikers used for self‑identification in Internet communications or postings” in § 9799.16(b)(1); and “designation used by the individual for purpose of routing or self‑identification in Internet communications or postings” in § 9799.16(b)(2). None of these phrases is defined, and the criminal charging statute, § 4915.1(a)(3), does not expressly reference the “internet identifier” language in § 9799.16 at all, even though the affidavit of probable cause imported that wording wholesale.​

Applying Pennsylvania’s vagueness standard—that a statute is void only if people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application—the court concluded that ordinary people might understand they must register email addresses and perhaps user names, but beyond that “have to guess what else is required.” Because the Commonwealth’s theory would extend registration to every website visited, every app used, and every automatically generated relay email, the court found the scheme unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied.​

Rejection of the Commonwealth’s expansive “internet identifier” theory

A central theme of the memorandum is the gulf between the statutory text and the Commonwealth’s operational practice. At the preliminary hearing, Trooper Vaccaro testified—relying on “Megan’s Law requirements”—that “all apps and websites” used with any “internet identifier” must be registered, and he described “internet identifier” so broadly as to include “anything that has to deal with going on the internet and a self‑identifier.” Yet in the prior Diebold habeas case, the Commonwealth had expressly conceded that SORNA does not require registration of every website used or every online account; instead, only identifiers used to communicate or post must be registered, and the trial court adopted that narrower reading in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.​

In this case, the Commonwealth oscillates again: its briefing insists that a username is meaningless for law‑enforcement purposes without an associated website, implying that the registrant must identify both the username and the site, while simultaneously denying that every site visited must be reported. The court critiqued this as internally inconsistent and practically unnecessary, noting that law enforcement already has broad subpoena and technical tools to track online activity and that SORNA does not impose a duty on registrants to optimize investigative efficiency beyond what the statutes clearly require.​

Craigslist relay emails and absurd‑results analysis

The court treated the Craigslist relay email requirement as especially illustrative of vagueness and absurdity. In the Commonwealth’s view, each auto‑generated, 32‑character “gigs” email string used to route replies to a properly registered email address is a separate “designation” that must itself be registered within three business days, even though the registrant does not create it and may receive numerous such strings from a single posting.​

Relying on the Statutory Construction Act’s presumption that the General Assembly did not intend absurd, impossible, or unreasonable results, the court reasoned that this reading would force frequent internet users to appear in person almost daily, and would criminalize everyday behavior like using travel websites while on an out‑of‑state vacation, given the in‑person, three‑business‑day reporting window. The opinion emphasizes that such an onerous, nearly impossible compliance burden cannot be squared with legislative intent, especially where the governing language never clearly tells registrants that websites or auto‑generated relays are covered.​

Severability and scope of the constitutional defect

Importantly, the court confined its constitutional ruling to the “internet identifier” components of SORNA, while holding the rest of the registration scheme severable and still enforceable. Citing Pennsylvania’s severability statute, the memorandum characterizes the internet‑related provisions as a discrete set of clauses that can be excised without undermining the remainder of SORNA’s operation.​

The court also distinguished its earlier, narrower rejection of a vagueness challenge in the first Diebold case, which dealt solely with whether the statute required registration of each website visited. In the prior matter, the court resolved that question by interpreting the law to reach only the registrant’s own “designation” (e.g., a username like “John Doe I”), not each site. Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth’s charging theory squarely presents whether a specific website and a Craigslist‑generated relay email qualify as required “designations,” forcing a fuller vagueness analysis that the Commonwealth’s conflicting interpretations and enforcement practices cannot survive.​

Broader doctrinal and policy implications

The memorandum situates Pennsylvania’s language alongside the federal SORNA definition of “internet identifiers” in 34 U.S.C. § 20916(e)(2), which similarly refers to email addresses and other designations used for self‑identification or routing in internet communications. The court treated that federal definition as equally inadequate, calling it “no definition at all” and observing that neither federal nor state law offers a workable, uniform meaning that registrants and law enforcement can reliably apply.​

Citing commentary that raises questions about whether “internet identifiers” encompass IP addresses, device‑linked accounts (like smart appliances), or work‑only usernames, the court underscored the open‑ended nature of the term and its susceptibility to arbitrary enforcement. The opinion closes by inviting the Commonwealth, if it wishes to regulate online activity more aggressively, to seek legislative clarification with input from law enforcement, rather than stretching vague language to criminalize conduct that ordinary people would not reasonably know must be reported.

“PARSOL and Mr. Diebold have forwarded the case specifics to the NARSOL legal team, and it is currently under review to determine if there is further action we can support,” said PARSOL Managing Director John Dawe. “PARSOL relies on our partnership with the national organization for this kind of support and is grateful to the team at NARSOL for its diligence.” 

While the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas memorandum represents a significant ruling declaring SORNA’s internet identifier provisions unconstitutionally vague and dismissing the charges with prejudice, it remains only a trial-level decision from a single county court and lacks statewide precedential effect. The Commonwealth retains the right to appeal this dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, potentially seeking reversal on grounds of differing interpretations of statutory vagueness or severability. A Court of Common Pleas decision—whether it strikes down a statute facially or as-applied—binds only the litigants in that specific case and has no precedential effect on other courts. It is recommended that individuals who must register continue registering their internet identifiers within three business days to avoid potential prosecution.