Commonwealth v. Kurtz
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 98, 99, 100 MAP 2023, marks a significant shift in how digital privacy is treated under Pennsylvania law. The Court held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in ordinary, unprotected Google search queries or related IP-address data. Because the Court found no privacy interest at stake, it declined to examine whether police had sufficient probable cause, effectively approving the use of reverse keyword search warrants—warrants that identify suspects by collecting data on everyone who searched specific terms.
This ruling departs from Pennsylvania’s long tradition of interpreting Article I, Section 8 of the state Constitution to provide stronger privacy protections than the federal Fourth Amendment. In past cases, Pennsylvania courts rejected the idea that people lose constitutional protection simply because modern life requires sharing information with third parties. A forceful dissent warned that internet search histories reveal deeply personal information and that allowing broad government access risks reviving the very “general warrants” the Pennsylvania Constitution was designed to forbid.
The implications of this decision extend far beyond one criminal case. By permitting suspicionless digital dragnets, the Court has lowered the barrier for government surveillance and shifted privacy protections onto individuals’ technical sophistication rather than constitutional guarantees. This decision deserves close scrutiny by lawmakers, advocates, and the public, as it reshapes the balance between public safety and personal liberty in an increasingly digital society.
- Majority Opinion: Justice Wecht
- Concurring Opinion: Chief Justice Todd
- Concurring Opinion: Justice Mundy
- Dissenting Opinion: Justice Donohue
Weatherholtz v. McKelvey
In Weatherholtz v. McKelvey, 57 MAP 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved a critical question left open after K.N.B. (a prior Court case): When does the statute of limitations begin to run for petitions under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act? The Court rejected the Superior Court’s conclusion that the six-year clock starts at the time of the original sexual violence. Instead, it held that a claim does not accrue until an act or circumstance demonstrates a continued risk of harm, because that is when a petitioner can first meet all statutory elements required for relief.
The Court emphasized that the Act is not a tort statute designed to compensate past injury, but a prospective, protective remedy aimed at preventing future harm. Sexual violence alone does not entitle a petitioner to relief; proof of ongoing risk is required. Starting the statute of limitations before that risk exists would bar claims before they are legally actionable, effectively nullifying the Act for many victims—particularly where offenders are incarcerated for long periods or resurface years later.
This decision preserves the Act’s core purpose while maintaining its built-in safeguards. Protective orders remain time-limited, judicially supervised, and subject to renewal only upon a showing of continued risk. By tying accrual to present danger rather than historical abuse, the Court restored doctrinal consistency, corrected the misreading of K.N.B., and ensured that victims are not denied protection simply because time passed before risk re-emerged.
Stay tuned for a more detailed analysis of these two cases.
